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CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES IN EMINENT
DOMAIN IN ILLINOIS
WILLIAM E. BRITrON 1

The purpose of this article is (1) to review the constitutional changed that have taken place in 'the law of
eminent domain in Illinois; (2) to discuss the proposals
which have been introduced in the present Constitutional
Convention; and (3) to indicate some of the more important constitutional changed which, in recent years,
have occurred in other states.

I.
Text of constitutional provisions.-The text of the
eminent domain clause under the constitution of 1818 was
as follows: "Nor shall any man's property be taken or
applied to public use without the consent of his repre-

sentatives in the General Assembly, nor without just
compensation being made to him."
This language was continued without change in the
constitution of 1848. The clause underwent important
changes in the constitution of 1870. The general clause
now provides: "Private property shall not be taken or
damaged for public use without .just compensation.
Such compensation, when not made by the- state, shall
be ascertained by a jury, as shall be prescribed by law.
The fee of land taken for railroad tracks, without consent of the owners thereof, shall remain in such owners,
subject to the use for which it is taken.""'
Separate sections were inserted which deal with the
right to condemn land for roads for private and public
use, for drainage purposes and with the condemnation of
property and franchises of corporations: "The General
Assembly may providefor establishing and opening roads
and cartways, connected with a public road, for private
1. Assistant Professor of Law, University of Illinois.
14. Art. II, Sec. 13.
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and public use.' '2 "The General Assembly may pass
laws permitting the owners or occupants of lands to construct drains and ditches for agricultural and sanitary
purposes across the lands of others. '" ' As amended in
1878 the section last quoted reads: "The General
Assembly may pass laws permitting the owners of lands
to construct drains, ditches, and levees for agricultural,
sanitary or mining purposes, across the lands of others,
and provide for the organization of drainage districts,
and vest the corporate authorities thereof with power to
construct and maintain levees, drains and ditches and
to keep in repair all drains, ditches and levees heretofore
constructed under the laws of this state, by special
assessments upon the property benefited thereby. '4
The provision relating to the condemnation of corporate franchises reads: "The exercise of power and
the right of eminent domain shall never be so construed
or abridged as to prevent the taking, by the General

Assembly, of the property and franchises of incorporated
companies already organized, and subjecting them to
the public necessity the same as of individuals. The
right of trial by jury shall be held inviolate in all trials
of claims for compensation, when in the exercise of the
said right of eminent domain, any incorporated company
shall be interested either for or against the exercise of
said right.'"I
Changes introduced by Constitution of 1870-It thus
appears that the constitutional convention of 1869-70
introduced several important changes in the law of
eminent domain, as it existed under the constitutions of
1818 and 1848. A short statement herefollows concerning the effect, in general, of these new provisions.
(1) A constitutional right to compensation was
given in cases where property has been damaged. Before
1870 the right to compensation was confined to cases of
2. Art. IV, Sec. 30.
3. Art. IV, Sec. 31.
4. Art. IV, Sec. 31.
S.

Art. IX, Sec. 14.
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actual takings. A taking was held to mean a taking of
the fee, or the taking of an easement or the impositionof an additional servitude upon land an easement in
which previously had been acquired, and in addition
included all direct physical injuries to property such as
the overflowing of land.6 Compensation was not required to be paid for non-physical injuries, such as
resulted from a change in the grade of streets or from
the construction of a railroad upon a street, the fee of
which was in the public. The introduction of the damage
clause gave a right to compensation in these cases.
Stated generally, an owner whose property has been
damaged under legislative authority and under color of
eminent domain has, under the -constitution of 1870, a
right to compensation to the same extent as he has
against private persons.7 . Illinois was the first state to
introduce this change. This example has been followecl
in about half of the states, most of which are western
states. This change in the law appears to have given
satisfaction, for there is to be found but little evidence
of a desire to return to the earlier rule, which is still in
force in most of the eastern states, under which property
may be damaged without compensation.
(2) The guaranty of the right to compensation for
damage to property has had an additional effect in this
state which was not a necessary consequence of the introduction of the damage clause. Under the constitutions of 1818 and 1848, in determining the amount of
compensation for land actually taken, it was held that
elements of special benefit to that part of the claimant's
land which had not been taken could be set off against
the value of the part taken." Without pointing out
any specific reason, the court has held that the effect of
the constitution of 1870 was to prevent the set-off of
benefits against the value of land taken, although the
court has never had the opportunity of passing upon a
6. Nevins v. Peoria, 41 Ill.,
502 (1866).
7. Rigney v. Chicago, 102 INl., 64 (1881).
8. State v. Evans, 3 Ill.,
208 (1840).
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statute which undertook to restore the rule as it was
under the earlier constitutions. 9 In takings by private
corporations this rule is followed in the great majority
of the states, but in about half the states, either as the
result of judicial construction of clauses similar to the
Illinois provision, or because of express constitutional
provision, set-off of benefits to remaining land against
the value of the part taken is allowed in takings by the
the state and by its agencies. If all agencies of the state
possessed the power of levying special assessments, the
rule forbidding set-off would be of little consequence.
But in Illinois where cities, towns, villages, park districts
and drainage distr'icts are the only agencies which may
levy special assessments, there is strong argument in
favor of allowing all governmental agencies, such as
counties, school and road districts and the Department
of Public Works and Buildings, the right to set off benefits
against the value of the land taken.
(3) The guaranty of jury trial to determine the
amount of compensation came into the constitution of
1870. Under the first two constitutions, the General
Assembly had power to and did provide other means
for the ascertainment of compensation, for the general
constitutional guaranty of jury trial was never construed
to apply to eminent domain proceedings.' 0 The provision
relating to jury trial as to compensation is found only in
about 0ne-third of the states, and in some of these only
in cases of appeal from a finding of some other body.
In about half of these states the provision does not apply
to takings by municipal corporations. The provision
has been the subject of come criticism in other states.
The state is expressly exempted from this provision
in Illinois. This exemption applies to all takings by the
state in its corporate capacity, such as takings by the
Department of Public Works and Buildings, but does
not exempt local governmental agencies.
9. Carpenter v. Jennings, 77 IH., 250 (1875).
10. Johnson v. J. & C. R. R. Co., 23 I., 202 (1859).
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(4) Under the constitutions of 1818 and 1848 there
was no constitutional limitation upon the power of the
General Assembly to authorize the condemnation of the
fee simple title to land. The constitution of 1870 provided that the fee of land taken for railroad tracks
should remain in the owner. Such a limitation as this
is found in the constitutions of but three other states,
Missouri, Oklahoma, and South Dakota. Since the
abandonment of the user causes a reversion of the right
of possession to the owner of the fee," this provision
works a hardship on railroad companies in the event of
a necessary removal of their tracks. In cases where the
removal of tracks is sought by a city in furtherance of its
improvement plan, the provision becomes an obstacle.
The elimination of this restriction has been urged by
civic bodies in Chicago, interested in the Chicago Plan.
If the provision is taken out it would seem that the roads
should also be given the right to condemn the fee of
lands now occupied by them in which they had previously
acquired easements under the existing constitution.
Proposal 121 accomplishes these purposes.
(5) The c6nstitution of 1870 also contains a provision not found in the preceding constitutions, expressly
declaring that the franchises and properties of corporations shall be subject to condemnation for public use.
The provision also reasserts the guaranty of jury trial
in eminent domain proceedings by or against corporations.
This provision is found in about one-third of the states.
Inasmuch as it has been held that the power of eminent
domain cannot irrevocably be granted away and that a
breach of an agreement not to do so is not an impairment
of the obligation of any contract, this provision adds no
power to that possessed under the general eminent
domain clause. 2
11.

Bell v. Mattoon Water Works Co., 245 Ill., 544 (1910)
C. & E. I. R. R. Co. v. Clapps, 201 Ill., 418 (1903).
12. Hyde Park v. Cemetery Association, 119 IlB., 142 (1886).
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(6) The convention of 1870 also extended the
meaning of the term "public use" to include two purposes primarily private, by inserting provisions authorizing the condemnation of land for roads for private and
public use, and for drainage purposes. Under the prior
constitution, it had been held that the General Assembly
could not authorize the taking of land for private rights
of way, 3 and probably would have held, had the question
been directly presented, that the taking of land for
drainage purposes was not a public use. Provisions of a
similar character relating to roads are found in about
one-third of the states. The drainage provision is also
found in about the same number of states. The drainage
section was amended in 1878 so as to permit the construction of levees, the construction of drains for sanitary
and mining purposes, the organization of drainage districts and the levying of special assessments to meet the
cost of such works.
II.
Four proposals relating to the power of eminent
domain have been introduced in the present Constitutional Convention. 4 Proposals 118 and 119 provide for
13. Nesbit v. Trumbo, 39 Ill., 110 (1866).
14. Proposal 118. When private property is taken for public use by the state
or any county, municipal corporation, subdivision or agency of the state, additional,
adjoining-or neighboring property may be taken in fee and thereafter held or disposed of under conditions fixed by general law.
Proposal 119. The General Assembly may provide that the state, or any county,
municipal corporation, subdivision or agency of the state, having the power of eminent
domain, may in furtherance of any public improvement involving the condemnation
of land, take in fee more land and property than are needed for such improvement.
Such additional land or property shall not be more in extent than sufficient for suitable building lots abutting on such public improvement or upon any street adjoining
the same. The General Assembly may provide that any part of land or property so
taken and not needed for the improvement may be held, improved or leased for value
with or without restrictions.
Proposal 120. The power of eminent domain shall extend to every species of
interest in real property including all rights and easements of any nature whatever,
on, under, upon, or over adjacent property, whether public or private, and irrespective of the origin of the same, whether in dedication or otherwise.
Proposal 121. Amends section 13 of article 2 of the present constitution by
omitting the provision: "The fee of land taken for railroad tracks, without consent of
the owners thereof, shall remain in such owners, subject to the use for which it is
taken;- and, by providing that, "any corporation having the power to take land by
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excess condemnation. Proposals 120 and 121 are designed to meet minor situations that have been disclosed
by judicial decisions or by. changes of policy. No proposals, other than those providing for excess condemnation, have been introduced which extend the
14 power of
eminent domain to include new public uses. 3'
The most important of these proposals are those
which authorize the use of excess condemnation. Excess
condemnation is the employment of the power of eminent
domain for purposes which are collateral or incidental to
some other object which is primary. The problem
which is sought to be solved by excess condemnation is
primarily a problem of the large city. The city desires
a greater control over the character of the neighborhood
surrounding public improvements, such as newly opened
or widened streets, public parks or buildings, for the
eminent domain, may take a fee or an easement in such land, as it may elect. And
any such corporation having heretofore acquired an interest in land less than a fee,
may condemn such remainder or reversionary interest so that it may become vested
with a complete fee simple title therein."
143/. In recent years in various states a number of constitutional provisions
have been adopted which extend the power of eminent domain. Uses which heretofore were not generally regarded as public have by this means become public uses.
These constitutional provisions fall into three groups: (1) There is a class which
adds new functions of government to the state or to its subdivisions but which does
not expressly confer the power of eminent domain as one of the means of their accomplishment. The ultimate effect, however, may be to draw the power of eminent
domain to the added functions. This class is the most numerous. (2) In the second
group, the sphere of government is extended and the power of eminent domain is
expressly mentioned as one of the means of effectuating the new purpose. Amendments falling in these two classes comprise a wide range of subjects: conservation of
natural resources, forests, reclamation work, internal improvements, municipal
ownership of public untilities, state insurance, mining, manufacture of cement, operation of grain elevators and flour mills, sale of necessaries, and building of homes.
(3) In the third class of amendments, the power of eminent domain is authorized to
be employed in a new direction, but for a purpose distinctly,incidental to the accomplishment of other functions, as for example when a city, in the location or widening of
streets or in the construction of public works, seeks to condemn land lying outside the
proposed improvement for the purpose of further insuring the success of the improve
ment, or for 6ther collateral objects. The properties taken are not directly and continuously used in the project but are sold after the incidental benefit arising from their
temporary possession has been realized.
The first and second classes of constitutional amendments simply expand the
power of eminent domain. Constitutional provisions of the third class likewise
extend the power of eminent domain but the difference in the objects sought to be
accomplished thereby has caused the introduction of the term "excess condemnation"
as descriptive of this additional authority
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primary purpose of protecting such improvements from
undesirable structures and for the more general objects
of stabilizing real estate value and insuring the proper
development of the district.
First, it is urged that the city be given power to
condemn the small remnants of lots which are left as a
result of the location or widening of streets, and in
addition, the power to condemn a sufficient amount of
land which, when added to the remnant, will make
suitable building sites and that the city be authorized
to sell the lot. Second, it is proposed that the city be
given power to condemn considerable areas adjoining a
public improvement for the purpose of reselling them
under proper restrictions designed to protect the improvement and to control the character of the buildings
in the section. Third, it is proposed that the city be
authorized to condemn the area surrounding an improvement and to sell the same for the purpose of recouping
the cost of the improvement.
Constitutionalityof statutes authorizing excess condemnation.-The courts of the United States, with practical
unanimity, have held unconstitutional under general
eminent domain clauses, statutes which authorize the condemnation of more land than is necessary for a proposed
improvement, such excess to be later sold or leased.
Such a taking is held not to be for a public purpose.
As early as 1824 the Supreme Court of South Carolina
took this position with reference to a statute which
authorized the taking and resale of lot remnants." A
few years later a similar statute of New York was held
unconstitutional." These two cases had the effect of
settling the constitutional question, at least for a time.
No statutes of like character are found until 1870, at
which time New Jersey passed an act authorizing the
replotting of land affected by an improvement so as to
15.

Dunn v. City of Charleston, Harpers Law Reports, 189.
16. In re Albany street 11 Wend. 149, (1834); Emery v. Conner, 3 N. Y. 511,
(1850).
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'absorb the remnants. 7 The act was never tested. In
1904, a remnant act was passed in Massachusetts.' s
A similar one, but with broader powers was enacted in
Ohio in the same year, followed by like legislation in Virginia in 1906, Connecticut and Pennsylvania in 1907,
Maryland in 1908, Wisconsin in 1909, New York in 1911,
and Oregon in 1913.
The Maryland act came before the court in 1911, and,
while the decision is not a square holding against its
constitutionality, for the point was not definitely in
issue, the language of the opinion points strongly in that
direction.' 9 Two years later, the Pennsylvania statute
was declared unconstitutional.2 0 This statute authorized
the condemnation and resale under building restrictions
of land within 200 feet of a proposed parkway. The
object of the taking was to.preserve the improvement.
There was a slight intimation by the court that the
taking of an easement for such a purpose might not be
objectionable, but the taking of land to be resold possibly
to others was held to promote a private purpose and was
therefore void. Proposed legislation of the same nature
was for like reasons said to be unconstitutional, in
opinions of the justices of Massachusetts, rendered to the
legislature in 1910.21 In its first opinion the court took
occasion to remark that the lot remnant act might be
sustained, but they stated that this legislation went
"to the very verge of constitutionality" and that it
could apply only when the particular remnant was too
small to be of any practical value and even then only
upon an adjudication that the public convenience and
necessity required the taking. With the exception of
this opinion, no authority has been found which is
favorable to the constitutionality of a statute authorizing excess condemnation under a general eminent domain
17. New Jersey Laws, Chap. 117 (1870).
18. Mass. Laws (1904).
19. Bond v. Baltimore, 116 Md. 683, (1911). See, also, Philadelphia etc. R.
Co. v. Baltimore, 121 Md. 504.
20. Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Philadelphia, 242 Pa. St. 47 (1913).
21. Opinions of the Justices, 204 Mass. 604, 204 Mass. 616.
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clause. Such judicial authority as there is, is in accord
in indicating that if municipalities are to be given the
power to condemn land which is not to be used for the
purposes of the improvement, but is to be resold for any
collateral object whatsoever, such power must be conferred by express constitutional provision. The statutes
in other states have not been before the courts, those
interested in their use apparently acquiescing in the
prevailing judicial opinion.
The question here discussed has never been raised
in the courts of Illinois, but in a case 22 decided in 1866
the Supreme Court of Illinois, in holding that a statute
which authorized the condemnation of land for private
rights of way was unconstitutional, took occasion to3
quote with approval from the Albany Street case
which held the New York lot remnant act void. There
is no reason to suppose that the courts of this state
would hold such an act valid. Under the existing eminent
domain clause it is definitely outside the scope of legislative power to authorize municipalities to condemn and
resell lot remnants, to take and resell lands for the purpose of protesting an improvement or for improving the
character of the neighborhood, or for purposes of recouping the cost of the improvement.
It has sometimes been said that a statute which
would authorize the condemnation of easements for the
purpose of protecting an improvement or for improving
the character of the neighborhood would be constitutional,
because this does not involve excess condemnation but
only an extension of the power of eminent domain, the
authority to resell after the taking being eliminated.
But little authority can be adduced in support of this
position. The case usually referred in this connection
is that of Attorney General v. J/illiams2 4

22. Nesbitt v. Trumbo, 39 111. 110.
23. 11 Wend. 149 (1834).
24. 174 Mass. 476, 178 Mass. 330, 188 U. S. 491 (1899).
Plan of Chicago, p. 148.

In this case

Walter L, Fisher,
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an act of the General Court of Massachusetts which
authorized the condemnation of easements of light and
air above the height of ninety feet surrounding Copely
Square in the city of Boston was held constitutional.
The limitation of the height of buildings is, however,
recognized everywhere as a legitimate exercise of the
police power, and the Massachusetts court intimated in
this case that payment of compensation would not have
been necessary. A recent Minnesota decision is, however, an authority for the proposition that apartment
houses may be excluded from certain specified districts
under the power of eminent domain. 25

The General

Assembly of Illinois has acted upon the assumption that
such an act is constitutional.26
List of Constitutional Provisions Authorizing Excess
Condemnation.-Constitutional amendments providing
for excess condemnation have been adopted in Massachusetts (1911), Ohio (1912), Wisconsin (1912), New
York (1913) and Rhode Island (1916). Amendments of
a broader character than those adopted in New York
and in Wisconsin were defeated in New York in 1911 and
in Wisconsin in 1914. An amendment similar to those
adopted in Ohio and in Wisconsin failed in California in
1914, 1915 and in 1918. An amendment similar to those
adopted in Massachusetts, New York and Rhode Island
failed of adoption in New Jersey in 1915.
Lot Remnants.-The problem of the lot remnant left
by the opening of widening of streets did not present
itself acutely in-Illinois until the city of Chicago undertook to carry out its extensive program of municipal
improvements. Upon the formulation of the city plan
several years ago this problem was anticipated, and it
25.

State ex rel. Twin City Building Co., 175 N. W. 159. (1920).

26. Sec. 3 of Art. IV, Act of 1915, providing for the consolidation of the local
governments of Chicago authorizes the condemnation of easements to control the
surroundings of parks. This act has never gone into effect, because dependent unon
a favorable popular vote in Chicago.
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was urged that the city should be granted power to
condemn lot remnants for the purposes
of facilitating
27
their union with adjoining property.
The recent widening of Twelfth Street and Michigan
Avenue, and the survey of the proposed Ogden Avenue
Avenue extension in the city of Chicago present the
problem of lot remnants in striking form. The Price
property located on Twelfth Street and Wabash Avenue
is said to be the most flagrant example. 8 The situation
with respect to this property is as follows: The Price
property had a frontage of 166 feet on Twelfth Street
and 71 feet on Wabash Avenue. The city took 68 feet
of the 71 feet on a frontage of 166 feet. This taking
left a lot remnant of 166 feet fronting on the widened
street with a depth of 3 feet. The loss to the city appears
from the following figures. The city paid $204,000 for
the 68 feet taken, that is, at the rate of $3,000 per front
foot on Wabash Avenue. The Supreme Court held the
remnant was damaged and not benefited and for this
damage the city paid $9,000, that is $3,000 per front foot.
The city, therefore, paid the owner as much for the
property which was not taken as it paid for the land
taken. Had it been allowed to take this remnant,
which it paid for in full, it could have recouped at least
a portion of this cost by sale to the owner of the adjoining
property.
The city also loses in the amount of the special
assessment which can be levied against the property in
the rear. In the case the 50-foot lot behind the remnant
was assessed $14,200. For the 25 feet nearest Twelfth
Street it was assessed $440 per front foot, or $11,000; for
the next 25 feet, $128 per front foot or $3,200. Had the
remnant been united with the adjoining property, at this
27. Legal Aspects of the City Plan, by Walter L. Fisher, in the report on "Plan
of Chicago" by the Commercial Club of Chicago.
28. Chicago Bureau of Public Efficiency, Report on Excess Condemnation,
Sept. 1918. This report discusses this problem in Chicago in detail and presents
several diagrams showing the size and shape of the remnants which have been left.
The Report of the Committee on Taxation of New York on Excess Condemnation
contains a number of photographs and diagrams of lot remnants in New York City.
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rate, such remnant as a part of the other property, would
have borne an assessment for benefits of $1,320, instead
of a damage of $9,000. As a matter of fact, however,
this three-foot strip and the rear property would have been
assessed at a rate higher than $440 per front foot, for
they could then have been assessed as corner property.
The probable increase in the assessment rate over $440
per front foot if it had been corner property appears
roughly from a comparison of the assessment on corner
property lying to the east and fronting on Michigan
Avenue. Here, the whole of the original corner property
was taken and a small part of the lot in the rear was
taken but there was left to this lot a frontage of 32 feet
on Michigan Avenue and a new frontage on Twelfth
Street of about the same length, so that it now became
corner property. This lot was assessed $1,220 per front
foot, or a total of $60,000 as compared with the assessment of $440 per front foot on the lot on Wabash Avenue
which was blocked off from the new street by the remnant.
Michigan 'Avenue property is about twice as valuable as
Wabash Avenue property at this point. After making
this deduction, it appears that the first 32 feet of frontage
on Wabash Avenue should have been assessed $30,000.
Actually this 32 feet was assessed but $11,500-nothing
for the first 3 feet, $11,000 for the next 25 feet and $500
for the remaining 4 feet. The city lost the difference
between $30,000 and $11,500, or $18,500, plus the $9,000
paid as damages for the 3-foot strip, making a total
loss of $27,500.
The report of the Chicago Bureau of Public Efficiency
from which the above facts are taken, states that 617
feet of frontage of the Michigan Avenue widening, out
of a total of 3,000 feet affected, will have depths of from
5 to 14 feet. Approximately one-fifth of the frontage
on one side of the Michigan Avenue improvement is thus
made up of remnants. The proposed Ogden Avenue
extension will leave 93 remnants, with a frontage of
approximately 3,300 feet on the proposed new street,
too small for building purposes.
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From these facts the primary reasons for allowing
the condemnation of lot remnants are apparent. There
is an unquestionable direct loss to the city. There is
also a loss to the property owners in the neighborhood.
The history of lot remnants in several cities shows that
they are apt to remain in separate ownership for years.
They cannot be used for building purposes. The street
is thus left in an ugly and irregular appearance. Frequently this condition is accentuated by the use of the
small area for billboards or other structures of temporary
nature out of keeping with the general character of the
neighborhood. The development of the street is greatly
retarded and the normal increase in real estate value is
checked. The improvement is thus robbed of much
of its effectiveness and the general utility of the district
is greatly impaired.
It has sometimes been urged that the taking of the
remnant is unnecessary because its union with the adjoining property can be brought about through private
sale or at most by authorizing the city to buy the strip
if the owner is willing. The experience of New York
does not justify this hope. The union of the two properties is dependent largely on the price asked for the remnant. The history of such parcels shows that-the main
obstacle is the wide difference of opinion as to price
between the owner of the remnant and the proposed
purchaser. The city, not primarily desiring pecuniary
gain from this strip, would be in a much better position
to cause the two properties to be united. Where the
remnant is owned by several persons having different
interests and some of them under disability the obstacles
to a private sale are great.
Investigations into the lot remnant problem have led
to the conclusion that the city should be given the power
to condemn these ill-shaped strips of land.
The Massachusetts Committee on Eminent Domain,
which made an exhaustive study of excess condemnation
here and in Europe, says in its report, "It often happens
that the owners of these remnants, desirous of deriving
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some income, erect temporary structures, unsuited for
proper habitation or occupancy. Such structures are
frequently made intentionally objectionable, both in
appearance and in the character of their occupancy for
the purpose of compelling the purchase of the remnant
at exorbitant prices. The result is that a new thoroughfare, which should be an ornament to the city, is frequently for a long period after its construction disfigured by unsightly and unwholesome structures to the
positive detriment of the public interests. "129
The Committee on Taxation of the City of New York,
in its report on excess condemnation, reaches a similar
conclusion. "New York furnishes several 'horrible
examples' in cutting new streets through sections already
built up without excess condemnation. Excess condemnation would leave the city free to re-arrange and
subdivide the land fronting the improvement into plots
of the size and shape best suited to the proposed development. '3,0

The Chicago Bureau of Public Efficiency, in its
recent study of this problem, concludes that, "If in
future projects the difficulties are to be avoided which
the city has met in the building of the Michigan Avenue
boulevard link and the widening of Twelfth Street, the
city must be given a free hand so that it can deal with
this problem, re-arranging the lots in a block to conform to the new street, thus making them available for
building purposes. When remnants are left it is essential
if the street is to be developed speedily that such remnants be united with adjoining property under a-single
ownership so that the combined plots can be made
suitable for building sites.'

29.

Massachusetts House Document, 228, (1904), p. 5.

30.

Report; 1915.

31.

Report on Excess Condemnation, Sept. 1918, p. 36.
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Writers on the question have reached similar conclusions. 32 Where proposed amendments have limited
the power of excess condemnation to the taking of land
sufficient to make suitable building sites, they been
adopted with one exception"-New Jersey.
Protection of public improvements.-In recent years
there has been considerable discussion as to the advisability of conferring upon municipalities the power to
condemn land bordering on an improvement, for the
purpose of facilitating the city's control over the character of the neighborhood. A new use of the power of
eminent domain is sought for purposes which are outside
the police power. While the city may, under its police
power, reasonably control building heights, and exclude
such business concerns from residential districts as
livery stables, public garages, brick yards and the like
and may exercise a fairly adequate control over billboards, it cannot establish an exclusively residential
neighborhood, nor a business district, except in so far as
these objects will prove to be attainable under a zoning
law such as was enacted in Illinois in 1919. The city,
under the police power, cannot impose restrictions upon
the general architectural style or value of buildings.
The various sections of metropolitan areas are undergoing continual change, with a destructive effect upon the
stability of land values and upon the harmony of architectural construction and arrangement. Slum areas
develop. Public improvements constructed at great
expense may fail to accomplish the objects for which they
were designed because their usefulness becomes impaired
by changed conditions. Building restrictions inserted
in deeds to newly sub-divided property operate as partial
32. Flavel Shurtleff and Frederick Law Olmsted, Carrying out the City Plan;
Lawson Purdy, Report of the Conference on City Planning, 1911, p. 121; Herbert
W. Swan, Report on Excess Condemnation, prepared for the Municipal League,
published by the Committee on Taxation of New York; Robert E. Cushman, Excess
Condemnation, p. 72; Ernst Freund, Conference on City.Planning, 1911, p. 242.
33.

Massachusetts, New York and Rhode Island.
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correctives where they exist, but the policy behind them
is not formulated with respect to the city's needs as a
whole.
It has been proposed, therefore, that the city be
given power to condemn land which borders upon public
improvements such as streets, parks, and public buildings
and to sell the excess land with restrictions as to the use
of the property; the power to be used with respect to
developed property as well as undeveloped property.
There has been virtually no experience in this country
in employing the power of eminent domain for this
purpose, but it has been used in England with considerable effectiveness during recent years. Constitutional amendments authorizing excess condemnation for
this purpose have been adopted in Ohio and Wisconsin,
both in 1912; but have failed of adoption in New York
and California.
It is argued that the city should have the power to
control, within reasonable limits, the character of a
district bordering on its own improvements, if it is willing
to pay for that privilege. It is urged that the exclusion
of inappropriate structures and business establishments
in residence districts, or of residences in business districts, the securing of reasonable harmony in architecture, building lines and uses of property, steady land
values and benefit property owners and the city economically and from a standpoint of aesthetics. It is also
urged that the realization of the full benefit -of the improvement would thereby be insured; that the power
would be an effective instrument for the rehabilitation of
insanitary areas; that public health, morals and welfare
would be promoted. Legislative investigative committees and civic bodies have reported in favor of this
extension of the power of eminent domain. 4
34. Report of Committee on Taxation of the City of New York on Excess Con
demnation; Chicago Bureau of Public Efficiency, Report on Excess Condemnation;
Plan of Chicago, Commercial Club.
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Several writers have likewise put themselves on
record as7 favoring this extension of the power of eminent
domain.1

The fundamental objection to excess condemnation
for the' purpose of controlling the character of areas
bordering on public improvements is, of course, that the
taking amounts to an unjustifiable interference with the
rights of private property. It is said that the public
welfare does not demand it; that the police power is
adequate"8 and that it is preferable to seek any desired
extension of control over the use and location of buildings
through the gradual expansion of the police power by
judicial decision rather than by abrupt changes in constitutional principles, upon the theory that gradual
changes are more calculated to represent the real desires
of the people. It is further urged that the exercise of
the police power entails little expense to the public as
compared with that which accompanies the taking of
property under the power of eminent domain and that
it is better to sacrifice the added control which cities
would derive from this extension of the power of eminent
domain than to adopt a policr which might lead to an
era of unfortunate land speculation for cities. Doubtless for these reasons proposed constitutional amendments providing for excess condemnation for these purposes have in some instances failed of adoption, as has
been the case in California. three times and in New York,
although such a constitutional provision has been adopted
in Ohio and Wisconsin.
In this connection a brief reference to municipal
zoning regulations may be made for the purpose of
showing the extent to which such regulations have been
upheld under the police power or denied, as being a
deprivation of property without due process of law.
37. Flavel Shurtleff, Carrying out the City Plan, p. 137; Robert E. Cushman,
Excess Condemnation, p. 116; Herbert S. Swan, Report on Excess Condemnation,
p. 19; William Bennett Munro, Principles and Methods of Municipal Administration,
p. 91.
38. Ernst Freund, Conferences on City Planning, 1911, p. 242.
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City plans, rather generally, seek an adequate control over the location and regulation of all offensive
industries, of advertising signs, and of ordinary business
establishments. Buildings are to be safely constructed,
limited to certain heights, to certain proportions of the
lot and to the uses to which they may be put. The
display of advertising signs is to be restricted. In
planning for undeveloped areas it is sought to prohibit
the building within the lines of officially mapped streets.
A thorough-going zoning system is sought. To what
extent are these objects attainable under the police
power without express constitutional authority?
The police power is adequate to compel the safe
construction of buildings,39 and to exclude from certain
districts any business which is a nuisance and many
which are not nuisances per se, such as public washhouses, public garages and the like.40 In the matter.
of excluding business establishments from specified areas,
the courts probably have not gone farther than in the
case of ex parte Hadacheck.41 In this case an ordinance
was sustained which excluded brick yards from residential
districts. Retail stores and similar business establishments, it has been
held, cannot be excluded from resi42
dence districts.
Nor may the police power be used to control the
general character and architecture of a building. The
issuance of building permits, conditioned upon the proposed building conforming in size and general character
and appearance to the general character of buildings in
the neighborhood, has been held not justified. 43 "A
citizen has the common law right to improve his property
as his taste, convenience or interest may suggest without
39. Commonwealth v. Roberts, 155 Mass. 281; Health Dept. v. Rector, 145
N. Y. 32.
40. Ex parte Quong Wo, 161 Calif. 220; Chicago v. Stratton, 162 Ill. 494 (1896);
Shea v. Maucie, 148 111. 14; People v. Ericsson, 263 Ill. 368 (1914).
41. 165 Calif. 416, 239 U. S, 394.
42. People v. Chicago, 261 11. 16 (1913); Stubbs v. Scott, 127 Md. 86, and
State v. Houghton, 134 Minn. 226, though the Minnesota decision was by a bare
majority.
43. Bostock v. Sams, 95 Md. 400.
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considering whether his building will conform to the
general character of buildings previously erected." says
the court. The compulsory establishment of building
lines is not generally within the police power" though
the recent case of Eubank v. Richmond45 sustained such
an ordinance which allowed the establishment of a building line on request of two-thirds of the property owners
in the district affected. This case was reversed by the
Supreme Court of the United States 46 but apparently
not upon the ground that no building line could be established. The requirement that dwellings be constructed
as separate and 47detached buildings likewise has been
held unreasonable.
The history of billboard regulation is a long one.
When the statute merely prescribes the manner of construction the regulation is valid.
If the statute prohibits the construction and display of bill-boards the
regulation is held invalid.49 The most advanced position
on billboard regulation yet taken by any court is the
recent decision in Cusack v. Chicago, 0 where an ordinance
prohibiting the erection of billboards in residential districts, except upon the written consent of the owners of
a majority of the frontage in the block, was sustained.
The ordinance was not sustained upon aesthetic grounds.
The court finds a relation to public morals and health.
Massachusetts has deemed this power inadequate and
has attempted to expand the police power by a constitutional amendment of 1918, as follows: "Advertising on
public ways, in public places, and on private property
within public view may be regulated and restricted by
law."
A similar provision was rejected in Ohio in 1912.
44. Fruth v. Charleston, 75 W. Va. 456; Curran v. Guilfoyle, 38 App. Div.
N. Y. 82.
44. In re Charleston, 57 App. Div. N. Y. 167; St. Louis v. Hill, 116 Mo. 527.
45. 110 Va. 749.
46. 226 U. S. 137.
47. Byrne v. Maryland Realty Co., 129 Md. 202 (1916).
48. Gunning v. St. Louis 235 Mo. 99; Chicago v. Gunning, 214 Ill.
628.
49. Haler v. Training School, 249 I1. 436 (1911).
50. 267 I1. 344 (1914); 242 U. S.526.
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A statute which imposes reasonable restrictions
upon the height
of buildings is a proper exercise of the
5.
police power.

Cities frequently desire to project new streets into
undeveloped territory in anticipation of future needs
and to prohibit the erection of buildings within the
lines of the proposed street, pending the taking of title.
Except in Pennsylvania
this has not been allowed under
2
the police power.

There has as yet been no thorough testing of the
constitutionality of zoning ordinances such as the one
which went into effect in New York City in 1916.
Several states have passed statutes enabling the adoption of such ordinances including Illinois in 1919. The
Illinois zoning law authorizes cities (1) to limit the
height of buildings, (2) to limit the bulk of buildings,
(3) to limit the intensity of the use of lot areas, (4) to
determine the area of yards and open spaces, (5) to
restrict the location of trades and industries, (6) to
exclude trades and industries from fixed districts, and
(7) to eatablish residential districts from which buildings
designed for business may be excluded. The act provides that no ordinance shall deprive owners of existing
prOperty of the right to continue the use of the property
for the purpose for which it was employed at the time
such ordinance goes into effect. The owners of a majority
of the frontage in any district, by written objection, may
prevent the enforcement of the ordinance. The Cusack
case, sustaining an ordinance prohibiting the erection of
billboards in residence districts except upon the written
consent of the owners of the majority of the frontage
in the block, is a fairly strong authority for the constitutionality of the Illinois act, but it remains yet to be
51. Welch v. Swasey, 193 Mass. 364, 214 U. S. 91; Cockran v. Preston, 107
Md. 220.
52. Forrester v. Scott, 136 N. Y. Suppl., 557; Edwards v. Bruorton, 184 Mass.
529; Bush v. McKeesport, 166 Pa. St. 57. See the analysis of the cases bearing on
the constitutional limitations on city planning powers in the report of the Conference
on City Planning, 1917, p. 199, by Edward M. Bassett, Special Counsel to the Zoning
Committee, New York City.
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seen whether the courts will extend the rule of that
case to justify such regulations as are sought to be
authorized by this statute. In Massachusetts it has been
assumed, apparently, that the decisions which concern
the constitutionality of zoning statutes do not go far
enough to make certain the constitutionality of such
acts, and accordingly by constitutional amendment of
1918, it was provided that:
"The General Court shall have power to limit buildings according to their use or construction, to specified districts of cities and towns."
Proposal 122, now pending
before the Illinois Constitutional Convention makes a
similar provision.
It is obvious that the problem of the lot remnant is
distinctly one of eminent domain and not of the police
power. As regards the protection of public improvements, assuming that ordinances enacted under the
Illinois zoning act will be upheld, still in many instances,
such regulations which were designed to meet the needs
of a relatively larger area *ill not afford the kind and
degree of protection desired. Such ordinances do not
and probably could not authorize compulsory changes in
existing properties, nor impose restrictions upon the
architectural style and value of buildings to be later
erected. Such changes probably can be effectively
accomplished only by the exercise of the power of eminent
domain.
To meet the objections that have been raised to the
use of excess condemnation for the purpose of protecting
improvements, two proposals have been made. One
consists in requiring the city to sell the land condemned
in excess, to its former owner if he wishes to buy it.
Only upon his rejection of the offer would the land be
offered to the general public. The Illinois proposals
do no contain any such guaranty, though the General
Assembly, under them would have power to impose
such a restriction. There would seem to be no public
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advantage in selling land to another when the former
owner is willing and able to retake title with the retrictions.
A second proposal, designed to meet some of the
objections and at the same time calculated to secure
many of the advantages of excess condemnation for the
purpose of protecting improvements, seeks to confer
upon municipalities the power to condemn easements
only in the adjoining land. Under this plan the property
owner is protected in his ownership but is restricted in
the use of his property. It is further urged that this
plan would involve less financial risk to the city. Within
certain limits, not well defined, the condemnation of
easements could be authorized by statute but any
thorough-going plan of control would probably meet
with constitutional objection. The recent act in this
state providing for the consolidation of the local governments of Chicago, but which has never gone into effect,
authorizes the city to acquire easements in lands in the
vicinity of parks for the purpose of controlling the surroundings. As to the policy of condemning assessments,
those who advocate broader power admit its effectiveness but deny that it goes far enough. As far as undeveloped territory is concerned, the condemnation of
easements probably would be adequate but it is contended that this power would not be adequate to protect
improvements or to change the character of a district
which is already improved.
Recoupment.-The proposal has been made to employ
the principle of excess condemnation for the purpose of
recouping the cost of a public improvement and for
intercepting a part of the increment of value added to
land as a result of the improvement. The adoption of
such a policy is advocated as a substitute for or as supplementary to the common practice in this country of
levying special assessments, or the practice in some
European countries of imposing increment taxes. It is
urged that the, city having created this increment of
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value is entitled to receive it. The economic justification for recoupment is much the same as that which
supports a tax on the unearned increment such as is
levied in England under the provisions of the Lloyd
George budget of 1909.
The principle of recoupment has never been adopted
in this country though it has been employed extensively
in European countries. In England the practice dates
back to the Land Clauses Consolidation Act of 1845, but
as a financial measure it has not been a success. Out of
fourteen miles of streets widened ,by the Metropolitan
Board of Public Works of London at a cost of $58,859,000
the sale of the surplus land totaled but $26,608,000.
A few street improvements have shown a margin of
profit. Later improvements put through by the London
County Council were, with but few exceptions, not
financially successful. The extensive improvements in
the city of Paris, during the days of the second empire,
showed a like loss. Land to the amount of $259,400,000
was condemned but in 1869 the city had recouped but
$51,800,000 from the sale of surplus lands and still had
on hand land valued at $14,400,000. Later projects
have likewise failed to produce a profit or meet the cost.
The experience of Belgium, while in many cases productive of heavy losses, in more recent years has been
more successful, particularly in projects which were
designed to change the character of slum areas. The
levying of special assessments is not common in Europe
though it is coming to be looked upon with greater favor.
In this country there is but little enthusiasm shown
for the adoption of the principle of condemning land for
purposes of recouping the cost of an improvement."3
The financial risks, apparent from European experience,
are deemed too great. The practice of levying special
assessmen-ts is regarded as preferable. When recoup53. Committee on Taxation of New York, Report on Excess Condemnation;
Chicago Bureau of Public Efficiency, Report on Excess Condemnation; Herbert
S. Swan Report on Excess Condemnation; W. L. Fisher, Legal Aspects of the City
Plan; R. E. Cushman, Excess Condemnation, Flavel Shurtleff, Carrying out the City
Plan.
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ment is favored at all, it is regarded not as the primary
object but as an incident to some other project such as
taking of lot remnants or the protection of improvements.
In every case in this country where a proposed constitutional amendment has been worded broadly enough
to permit the taking of excess land for purposes of recoupment, it has been defeated. This has been the
case in New York, Wisconsin, and California, although
in the first two states amendments of more limited scope
have been adopted.
Illinois proposals authorizing excess condemnation.Proposal 118 provides that when private property is
taken for public use by the state or any county, municipal
corporation, subdivision or agency of the state, additional,
adjoining or neighboring property may be taken in fee
and thereafter held or disposed of under conditions fixed
by general law.
This provision is broad enough to
authorize the condemnation of property for purposes of
recoupment as well as for the purpose of protecting
improvements and of eliminating lot remnants. To the
extent that it justifies the use of excess condemnation
for purposes of recouping cost the section is broader than
similar provisions which have been adopted in other
states. The amendments adopted in Massachusetts,
New York and Rhode Island merely make provision for
the lot remnant problem. The amendments adopted
in Ohio and Wisconsin authorize the use of eminent
domain for the purpose of providing suitable building
lots and also for the purpose of preserving the improvement. The Illinois proposal is substantially the same
as the proposed amendments which were defeated in
New York in 1911 and in Wisconsin in 1914, except
that the Illinois proposal is an enabling act and confers
the power on all agencies of the state, while the New
York and Wisconsin proposals were probably self executing and confined the exercise of the power to municipal
corporations. As regards the interest in land which
may be taken it is to be noted that the Illinois proposal
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expressly authorizes the condemnation of the fee. It has
not always been thought necessary in other states to
expressly authorize the taking of a fee but it is expedient
in Illinois for the Supreme Court has never directly
held that the General Assembly possesses the power to
authorize the condemnation of the fee. On the contrary it has been intimated slightly that such power could
be denied. Since the section does not specify that
lesser interests may be taken it is conceivable, however,
that the power to condemn in excess might, under the
phraseology, be confined exclusively to the taking of the
fee and would not permit the condemnation of easements
or other interests. This construction is made more possible because proposal 121, an amendment to the general
eminent domain clause, expressly authorizes the condemnation of the fee or of an easement, and proposal 120,
likewise an amendment to the general eminent domain
clause, expressly authorizes the taking of any interest
in real property. This result would be unfortunate for
the condemning authority might find it expedient in some
cases to take easements only.
Proposal 119 restricts the power of excess condemnation to the taking of an amount of land sufficient for
suitable building sites as was done in Massachusetts,
New York and Rhode Island. The power is conferred
upon all agencies of the state and can be employed in
connection with any public improvement, while in the
states mentioned the power is restricted to specified
agencies, such as the state and its cities and is restricted
to specified public improvements such as laying out or
widening of streets or locating parks and public places.
If proposal 118 were adopted there would be no necessity
for the adoption of proposal 119.
Illinois proposals amending the general eminent
domain clause.-Proposal120, provides that "the power
of eminnt domain shall extend to every species of interest in real property including all rights and easements
of any nature whatever, in, under, upon or over adjacent
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property, whether public or private, and irrespective of
the origin of the same, whether in dedication or otherwise."
The purpose of this clause is to avoid the possible
effect of the decision in the case of South Park Commissioners v. WJard.54 This case presented a special
problem arising out of the condemnation of property
already devoted to public use. It is well established of
course that property already devoted to public use is
still subject to condemnation for other public uses where
a status so provides. In the Ward case it appeared that
a portion of what-now comprises Grant Park in the City
of Chicago was dedicated by the Canal Commissioners
to the public. The plat designated the lake front as
open ground, no buildings."
Another portion was
dedicated by the United States and the plot similarly
stated, "public grounds forever to remain vacant of
buildings." These dedications were duly accepted by
the city of Chicago.
The General Assembly of' Illinois subsequently
authorized the South Park Commissioners to condemn
the easements thus created and possessed by the owners
of the property abutting on the park, and authorized the
erection therein of a museum. The court held that the
General Assembly had no power to authorize the condemnationof these easem'ents because the land had been
accepted under these restrictions. The decision was not
expressly based upon the ground that the proposed new
use was not public but was based upon the broad proposition that the state, having accepted the land with the restricttions, could not rid itself of them for any purpose.
Three of the members of the court dissented. The precise
point has apparently not arisen elsewhere. In view of
the probability that needs of the state may often demand
a change in the use of property dedicated under restrictions, this decision might prove of difficulty.
The
adoption of proposal 120 would therefore seem desirable.
54.

248 Ill. 299 (1910).
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Proposal 121 amends the general eminent domain
clause by omitting the provision which forbids the
General Assembly from authorizing the condemnation
of the fee in land taken for railroad tracks, and also provides that "any corporation having the power to take
land by eminent domain, may take a fee or an easement
in such land, as it may elect. And any such corporation
having heretofore acquired an interest in land less than a
fee may condemn such remainder or reversionary interest so that it may become vested with a complete
fee simple title therein." This proposal accomplishes
three objects: (1) it removes the restriction upon the
taking of the fee in land for railroad tracks, (2) it
authorizes without further legislation any corporation
which heretofore has acquired an easement to condemn
the reversionary interest in the fee, and (3) makes it
certain that in all takings by corporations a fee may be
condemned.
(1) The restriction relating to railroads is the only
express constitutional limitation in Illinois upon the
power of the General Assembly to authorize the taking
of the fee in lands. This restriction upon railroads is
found only in the constitutions of Illinois, Missouri,
Oklahoma and South Dakota. It has been urged that
this restriction is unjust because the easement cannot be
sold, an abandonment causing a reverter.55 The Chicago
Bureau of Public Efficiency recently stated: "There is
public interest in this matter in connection with city
planning. One of the aims of Chicago City planners is
to secure a rearrangement of railroad terminals in Chicago
which would permit of the abandonment for railroad
use of considerable railroad property. It would seem
that the constitution should provide that the railroads
after having made use of property in good faith for railroad purposes should retain title and have the power to
sell it and retain the proceeds in case the city authorities
agree, and it is no longer needed for railroad purposes."
55. C. & E. I. R. R. Co. v. Clapp, 201 Ill. 418, (1903)
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(2) The last sentence of proposal 121 was inserted
primarily for the purpose of enabling railroad companies
which have heretofore condemned easements in land for
railroad tracks to take the outstanding interest and thus
to avoid any loss that would otherwise be occasioned by
abandonment.
(3) As regards the power to condemn the fee in
general, the Supreme Court had held that statutes which
delegate the power of eminent domain, confer the right
to condemn easements only. 6 It has also been held
that it is a question for the courts to determine whether
there is a necessity for a particular taking and, whether
the amount of land sought to be condemned is actually
needed.17 It is possible, therefore, for the court to say
that it is not a public use to take the fee, if in any case
the court thinks a right of user sufficient. To allay the
doubt as -to the power of the General Assembly to
authorize the condemnation of the fee this proposal was
introduced.
One feature of this proposal may prove somewhat
objectionable. The section provides that "any corporation having the power of eminent domain may take a
fee or an easement in such land, as it may elect." This
clause could be construed as forbidding the taking of a
fee by any authority which was not a corporation. As
far as railroads, telegraph companies and the like are
concerned it may be wise to compel them to incorporate
before conferring upon them the power to condemn
private property provided it can be said that the corporate form of doing business will be as common fifty or
a hundred years from now as it is today. On the other
hand governmental agencies other than bodies corporate
are frequently given the power to condemn property.
The result could be obviated, of course, by creating such
56.

Tacoma Safety Deposit Co. v. Chicago, 247 Ill. 192 (1910); Miller v. Com-

missioners of Lincoln Park, 278 Ill. 400 (1917).
57.

Chicago v. Lehman, 262 II. 468 (1914).
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governmental agencies corporations in the first instance
but it is possible that for other reasons this might not
be advisable.
Proposals 118 and 119 restrict the power of eminent
domain to the taking of a fee. Proposal 121 restricts the
power to the taking of the fee or an easement; while
proposal 120 extends the power "to every species of
There would seem to be no
interest in real property."
substantial reason for the adoption of different phraseology in the four sections. If a strict construction of
proposal 121 were adopted the General Assembly, for
example, could not authorize the condemnation of a
profit which under proposal 120 such an interest could
be taken. The taking of a profit, while not common is
sometimes authorized as was done by the act passed by
the-General Assembly of Illinois in 1919, which authorizes
the Department of Public Works and Buildings "to
acquire by condemnation mines, quarries, gravel beds,
clay beds, mineral deposits or other property for procuring materials necessary in the construction and maintenance of public improvements by the State of Illinois."
There may be occasion for the condemnation of interest
in land other than fees or easements and the right to do
so should not remain in doubt.
III.
Constitutionalprovisions extending State functions.Constitutional provisions recently adopted in other
states, which extend state functions but which do not
expressly confer the power of eminent domain with
respect to such new functions, relate either to the conservation of natural resources or to the conduct of some
business enterprise.
Constitutional provisions authorizing the creation of
forest preserves have been in force for some time.5 8
'In the absence of a constitutional provision authorizing
58. Constitutional provisions relation to forest preserves will be found in Ohio,
New York, Wisconsin, Washington, Montana, Idaho and Arizona.
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the condemnation of land for the purpose of creating a
forest preserve, a statute which confers this power
probably would be constitutional. No case has been
found which directly presents this question but the purpose might be regarded as analagous to that of public
parks. It has been held in Illinois that it is proper to
employ the taxing power to maintain forest preserves. 9
The broader policy of conservation of all natural
resources has been adopted in some states. The constitution of Idaho declares that the use of lands for the
development of the natural resources of the state or the
preservation of the health of the inhabitants shall constitute a public use. By an amendment adopted in 1918,
Massachusetts authorizes the condemnation of land for
the conservation of natural resources. In 1919 Texas
provided for the conservation of natural resources and
the creation of conservation districts. The preservation
and distribution of water, irrigation, reclamation, drainage,
forests, water and hydro-electric power were expressly
referred to as being within the objects of the Texas
amendment. The power of eminent domain was not
expressly mentioned in the Texas amendment. South
Dakota has recently authorized the state to invest its
funds in, and to lend its credit to, corporations organized
for the development of natural resources.
The reclamation of privately owned swamp and
arid land is not usually undertaken by the state directly,
but express constitutional provisions are common which
authorize quasi-public corporations to condemn land for
such purposes. There is but slight evidence of a desire
to change this policy. Within certain limits, not clearly
marked out, the state, under general constitutional provisions, may condemn, reclaim and sell land. The condemnation and reclamation of the Back Bay flats district in Boston harbor by the state was one of the most
extensive of such reclamation projects. The statute
which authorized this work was held constitutional under
59. Perkins v. Commissioners of Cook Co. 271 Ill. 449 (1916).
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the general domain clause," but its validity was made
more certain because of its close relation to the promotion of commerce."
Condemnation of land on a
broad scale in furtherance of a definite policy of state
reclamation work could scarcely be attempted in the
absence of express constitutional provision.6 2 The legis-

lature of the state of Washington at its last session proposed an amendment to be voted on in 1920, which
declares that the taking of private property by the state
for land reclamation and settlement purposes shall be a
public use. An amendment which would have authorized
the state to contract indebtedness for the reclamation of
wild lands failed of adoption in Arizona in 1914; and a
similar proposal increasing the state debt limit for building roads, constructing irrigation and power projects
and developing untilled lands, was rejected in Oregon in
the same year.
A few constitutional provisions empower the state
to enter generally into the construction of works of
internal improvement. In some states the power to
construct such works is prohibited. But the construction of public roads and the improvement of lands donated
to the state are commonly excepted from the prohibition.
In this connection mention should be made of the act
passed at the 1919 session of the General Assembly of
Illinois which grants power to the Department of Public
Works and Buildings: "To acquire by condemnation
under the eminent domain laws of this state, lands, mines,
quarries, gravel beds, clay beds, mineral deposits, or
other property for procuring materials or producing
manufactured products necessary in the construction
and maintenance of public improvements by the state
of Illinois; to lease, purchase, construct, maintain and
operate lands, mines, plants and factories for the production of any raw materials or manufactured products
60.

Moore v. Sanford, 151 Mass. 285 (1890).

61.

Opinion of the Justices, 204 Mass. 607.

62.

Cooley; Constitutional Limitation* (7th Ed.) Sec. 766.
I
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necessary in the construction and maintenance of public
improvements by the state of Illinois.63 Constitutional
amendments have been adopted in North Dakota and in
South Dakota which authorize the state to engage in
works of internal improvement. 4 Wyoming permits the
state to engage in works of internal improvement
when authorized by two-thirds vote of the people.
The power of eminent domain has been employed in
European countries for the purpose of abating insanitary
areas, and while it has been discussed to some extent in
this country, this policy has not been acted upon. It is
unlikely that the courts would sustain, under the general
eminent domain clause, a statute which authorized the
condemnation of properties for the purpose of changing
the character of the neighbohood.65 The nearest approach
to a policy of this character is that contained in the
Massachusetts amendment of 1915 which authorizes the
state to take land for the purpose of relieving congestion
and for providing homes for citizens. A city may, of
course, cut wide thoroughfares through an insanitary
area; and in states which, by recent amendment, permit
the condemnation of land bordering upon an improvement for the purpose of protecting it, a much greater
portion of the district could be changed. The employment of the power of eminent domain to abate slum districts has been discussed and proposed,66 but the great
expense and the likelihood that the abatement of one
area would merely cause its6 re-appearance
elsewhere has
7
led others to oppose its use.
Constitutional provisions in several states expressly
authorize the condemnation and operation of public
utilities by municipalities. With respect to the power of
63. Illinois Laws, 1919, p. 712.
64. South Dakota, 1918, authorizes the State to engage in works of internal
improvements and to lend its credit to corporations for this purpose. North Daokta,
1918, authorizes the state or any of its subdivisions to make internal improvements
or to engage in any industry not prohibited.
65. Salisbury Land Co. v. Commonwealth, 215 Mass. 371.
66. See Proceedings of Conference on City Planning, 1912, p. 100.
67. Dewsnup, Housing Problems, p. 233; Swan, Excess Condemnation, p. 481.
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a city to condemn existing public untilities, it has been
held in New York that a statute enacted under the
general eminent domain clause justifies such a taking."8
The power to condemn public utilities has been conferred
upon Illinois cities by an act of 1913.69 The power to
acquire harbors, canals, wharves, levees, and all appropriate harbor structures, elevators and warehouses was
delegated to municipalities in the same year.70 Little
doubt could be raised as to the constitutionality of the
main features of these acts, but objections might be raised
with respect to the provision found in each which
authorizes the city to lease to.private corporations for a
limited number of years the utilities taken over by the
city by condemnation proceedings. While the courts
elsewhere allow the condemnation of properties in fee
and their ultimate sale upon the abandonment of the
undertaking, they have refused in other types of cases to
permit the taking of land from a private person to be
immediately sold or leased to another private person.
A constitutional provision in Ohio expressly authorizes
the condemnation and leasing of public utilities by
municipalities. Other provisions relating to the acquisition and operation of public utilities are to be found in
Arizona, California, Colorado, Louisiana, Michigan,
Missouri, Oregon and South Carolina.
The power of eminent domain under general eminent
domain clauses cannot be employed to aid an enterprise
which is not invested with a public interest, nor to aid
the state or its subdivisions, when such enterprises are
conducted by them.' In a number of states there exist
constitutional prohibitions upon the granting of aid to
private enterprises by the state or municipalities or both.
The extension of the functions of government in some
states to include the conduct of business enterprises may
68. In re City of Brooklyn, 143 N. Y. 596, affirmed 166 U. S.685.
69. Hurd's R. S.1917, Chap. liA, Secs. 87-101.
70. Hurd's R. S.1917, Chap. 24, Sec. 70 et. seq.
71. School v. Coal Co., 118 Ill. 427 (1887) (mining). Banker v. Grand Rapids,
142 Mich. 687, (state cannot condemn land for coal yard or for a plumbing esthffiblishment). Keen v. Waycross, 10 Ga. 588; Mather v. Ottawa, 114 Ill. 659 (1885).

EMINENT DOMAIN

have the effect of expanding the power of eminent domain.
In North Dakota the state has been given the power by
constitutional amendment of 1918 to engage in any private
enterprise which is not expressly prohibited by the constitution. The state of Oklahoma may engage in any
occupation or business except agriculture. In Arizona
the state and municipal corporations have the right
to engage in any industrial pursuit. In other instances
the power is conferred upon the state to engage-in certain
specified enterprises, such as providing for state insurance against loss by hail in North Dakota and in
South Dakota, engaging in mining and the manufacture
of cement in South Dakota, in the establishment and
operation of grain elevators and flour mills 7 2 and in

supplying necessaries of life in time of war or other
emergency.7 3 An amendment was adopted in Massachusetts in 1915, which authorized the condemnation of
land to relieve congestion and to provide homes.74 At its
1919 session the legislature of Kansas proposed an
amendment to be voted on in 1920 which authorizes the
creation of a fund to encourage the purchase of farm
homes.75 A proposal to levy a land tax to establish a
home-maker's fund was defeated in Oregon in 1916.
Constitutional provisions expressly extending power
of eminent domain.-Recently adopted constitutional provisions which extend the use of eminent domain in
addition to those authorizing excess condemnation,
relate to the conservation of natural resources, to the
acquisition of public utilities by municipalities and to
housing projects. The constitutions of Ohio and Wisconsin authorize the taking of land for forest preserves.
The conservation of natural resources is declared to be
72. South Dakota; North Dakota.
73. Massachusetts 1917.
74. This action followed an opinion of the Justices of the Supreme Court, 211
Mass. 624, that such a project was not a public purpose. See also, Salisbury Land
Co. v. Commonwealth, 215 Mass. 371, (1913).
75. Kansas Session Laws, 1919.
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a public use in the constitution of Idaho, and an amendment in Massachusetts in 1918 authorizes the condemnation of land for reclamation and settlement purposes.
The constitutions of several states authorize the condemnation and operation of public utilities by cities.
An amendment adopted in Massachusetts in 1915
authorizes the condemnation of land to relieve congestion of population and to provide homes for citizens.

